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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than 
second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third 
parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment decisio ns as 
independent bystanders. We find that third parties punished more frequently, severely, and 
less antisocially, resulting in a higher contribution level than that driven by second party 
punishment. The third party’s exaggerated emotion towards free riders is proposed to explain 
their superior punishment effectiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
Extant literature has documented the importance of peer punishment in enhancing 
cooperation, coordination, and contribution (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Nikiforakis, 2008; 
Reuben and Riedl, 2013). While the main focus was on second-party (or peer) punishment by 
punishers who are directly affected by those whom they punish (for a review, see e.g. 
Chaudhuri, 2011), a growing literature switched attention to another non-negligible type of 
punishment, the one by third parties who are independent of or only indirectly affected by 
those whom they punish (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Leibbrandt & López-Pérez, 2012). 
We will refer to peer punishment as second-party punishment (SPP) hereafter. Regarding 
punishment effectiveness, second parties could punish more severely because they are 
directly harmed by bad behaviors (e.g., free riding); however, they are also found to suffer 
from antisocial punishment which may deteriorate effectiveness (Herrmann et al., 2008). In 
an unaffected position, third parties may have less incentive to punish, but could potentially 
punish more impartially. Since both SPP and third-party punishment (TPP) have pros and 
cons, no conclusion has been drawn in the literature regarding which type is more effective. 
The present paper contributes to this literature by uncovering evidence in favor of TPP in a 
controlled experiment. 
Several experimental studies have shed some lights on this puzzle but have not reached 
agreement. In the one-shot modified dictator game, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) report 61% 
of the third parties did punish, compared with 74% of the second parties; and the ratio was 54% 
vs. 60% in Leibbrandt and López-Pérez (2012). Fehr and Fischbacher’s one-shot prisoners’ 
dilemma suggests similar pattern: third parties punished less frequently and less severely than 
second parties.  
By contrast, the repeated One-way Treatment in Carpenter and Matthews (2009) shows that 
the average expenditures on TPP and SPP were 0.67 and 0.50 points respectively, indicating 
that third parties punished more severely. However, they failed to control for the potential 
scale effect: a second party was able to punish only 3 others while a third party was able to 
punish 4. Besides, each punisher simultaneously played both roles of second and third party, 
so the potential interaction effect remains unclear, and hence we cannot compare the two 
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types of punishment directly. Our experiment controls for the scale effect and lets each 
punisher only take one role at a time, so as to provide a more precise and persuasive 
comparison. 
2. The Experiment 
Using between-subject design, the experiment consisted of two treatments: SPP (treatment S) 
as a baseline and TPP (treatment T). Each treatment had two stages: the Contribution stage 
followed by the Punishment stage. Each session of both treatments lasted for 20 periods. In 
each period participants were matched anonymously and randomly, and played the game in 
groups of four. 
The Contribution stage was the same in both treatments. At the beginning each subject 
received an endowment of 20 tokens, and then simultaneously decided how many tokens to 
contribute to the public account with the marginal per capita return equal to 0.4, meaning one 
token contributed increased each in-group member ’s payoff by 0.4 tokens. At the end of this 
stage, subjects were informed of their own payoffs. 
In the beginning of the Punishment stage in S, subjects were informed of each in-group 
member’s contribution. Then they decided whether to punish, whom to punish and how many 
tokens to assign for punishing. One token used to punish cost one token to the punisher, but 
reduced three tokens of the earning of the targeted subject. 
Treatment T was the same as S except that in the Punishment stage players made punishment 
decisions as independent third parties. This technique was similar to that in Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004). Groups were numbered 1 through 6, and each group could only punish 
members in the next adjacent group.1 In the beginning of the Punishment Stage, third parties 
were only informed of contribution levels of the group they could punish, but no information 
regarding their own group. Hence, from a punisher’s perspective second parties and third 
parties were in informationally equivalent position. To alleviate the potential scale effect, we 
allowed each third-party punisher to punish only the members of the target group who had 
different within-group ID numbers from the punisher, so each second and third party had the 
                                                                 
1 We disallowed the last group to punish the first group to avoid the punishment circle that may add reciprocity effect.  
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opportunity to punish a maximum of three others. 
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree 3.3.12 (Fischbacher, 2007) in Shenzhen, China. 
Totally 36 graduate students participated in Treatment S and 24 in Treatment T; 35 were 
males and 25 females. Each session took about 1.5 hours. The show up fee was 30 RMB 
(about 4.9 USD). The exchange rate between experimental tokens and RMB was 10:1. The 
average earning was 70.4 RMB (11.5 USD). The experimental instructions can be found in 
Supplemental Material A.  
3. Results 
Figure 1 displays the average punishment and contribution to public goods by treatment. At 
individual level, third parties punished more severely than second parties (1.6 vs. 0.9 tokens 
on average, t-test, p=0.025). As to punishment frequency, 40.6% of third parties and 37.5% of 
second parties punished at least once. Each subject had the opportunity to punish three others 
per period. Out of these punishment opportunities, punishment frequency was 25.9% for T 
and 19.9% for S (Pearson-chi-square test, p<0.01), showing again that third parties punished 
more frequently. Though both average severity and average frequency decreased gradually 
over periods, the frequency difference in frequency persisted (see Figure B1 in Supplemental 
Material B). 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of punishment frequency and severity respectively against 
the contribution difference between the punished and the punisher, bracketed into 3 
categories: [-20, -2), [-2, 2], (2, 20].2 Figure 2 shows that both third and second parties had 
similar attitudes towards deviators, i.e. the more a person deviated, the more likely and 
severely the person was punished. Regression analyses confirmed these findings (see 
Supplemental Material C). We also graphed the punishment distribution against the deviation 
from the target’s group average, and found similar pattern (see Figure B2 in Supplemental 
Material B). Besides, there was a strong asymmetry: third parties were more sensitive to 
negative deviations (i.e., free riders) than to positive ones (i.e., cooperators). 
                                                                 
2 For example, suppose N is the punisher and M is the punished. M’s contribution is 5 tokens while N’s is 15 tokens; then the 
deviation of M to N is -10. 
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In public goods game antisocial punishment (ASP) refers to punishment towards the player 
who contributes no less than the punisher (Herrmann et al., 2008). Figure 2 also shows that 
ASP existed among both second and third parties, implying third parties were not absolutely 
impartial. ASP amounted to about 27% in both treatments: 115 out of 430 in S and 83 out of 
311 in T. However, third parties imposed more punishment on free riders (2.92 vs. 1.35) and 
less on contributors (1.18 vs. 1.80). This suggests TPP was less antisocial (also see regression 
in Supplemental Material C). 
Potentially due to the more frequent, severer, and less antisocial TPP, the average 
contribution was higher in T than in S (9.8 vs. 6.4, p<0.01), as shown in Figure 1. This 
indicates a higher effectiveness of TPP. Only 0.7 more tokens spent on punishment by third 
parties resulted in a 3.4-token higher contribution on average, compared with SPP, a net 
benefit of 2.7 tokens. 
Our results are consistent with Carpenter and Matthews (2009) but seemingly contradictory 
with Fehr and Fischbacher (2004). One explanation would be strategic punishment. However, 
this should not be a serious issue in our experiment because (1) we used a s tranger-matching 
design; (2) the substantial amount of punishment at the end of experiment cannot be 
explained by strategic motivation (see Figure B1 in Supplemental Material B); (3) second and 
third parties faced the same probability of being re-matched with those they punished, so 
neither should have a stronger strategic motive. A plausible explanation we propose is the 
emotion effect: third parties showed stronger negative emotions toward bad behavior (e.g., 
Bosman and Van Winden, 2002; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). In Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004) the third parties were purely independent without the chance of experiencing elevated 
emotions. In our treatment S, second parties only experienced being free ridden; in T, 
however, third parties not only experienced being free ridden but also observed free riding on 
others. Such kind of doubled experience should associate with stronger negative emotions 
that triggered heavier punishment.3 To provide solid evidence supporting such explanation, a 
supplemental quasi-experiment was conducted (see Supplemental Material D). The results 
                                                                 
3 An anonymous referee mentioned blind revenge as an explanation. We tested it and find it was significant only in SPP 
decision model, but it didn’t significantly influence any punishment intensity. 
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reveal that stronger negative experience indeed associated with stronger negative emotion 
that triggered heavier punishment. 
4. Conclusion 
In a public goods experiment, we let third parties play the standard contribution game and 
then make punishment decisions, which were compared to second-party punishment in the 
same setup. Since third parties could not punish in-group free riders, their anger might have 
been elevated so that they sanctioned more heavily towards out-group free riders. As 
expected, third parties indeed punished more frequently, severely, and less antisocially, 
leading to a higher level of contribution.  
Our findings suggest that incorporating third-party punishers with similar prior experience 
into punishment institutions would lead to beneficial consequences. For example, in the US a 
jury of a criminal trial selected from the community has some power to judge whether a 
wrongdoing is guilty. If the jury were composed of people who had similar prior experience, 
it could potentially help defend justice, yet the issue arises regarding whether third parties 
who suffered from prior negative experience may be too emotional and over-punish. Besides, 
emotion is just a conjectured mechanism to explain why third parties punished more. The 
lack of direct evidence linking experience, emotion, and heavier punishment calls for further 
investigation. 
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Figure 1 Mean punishment and contribution by treatment 
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Figure 2 Punishment distribution: frequency and severity 
 
  
10 
 
Supplemental Material A: Experimental Instructions 
Instruction for S treatment 
Welcome to this economic experiment. Be sure that it is safe, both physically and mentally.  
If you follow the rules in this experiment and make your decision on your own, then you may earn a 
considerable amount of money. Therefore, please carefully read this instruction and learn these rules. 
Talking and any form of communication among you are not allowed when experiment is on. If you have 
any question, please raise your hand.  
The money in the experiment is named ‘token’. The experiment will run 20 periods, namely the game will 
repeat 20 times. You final earning is the total earnings in 20 periods. Earning will be calculated in token, 
and your final earning will be exchanged into RMB (USD) at the end of the experiment. 10 tokens equals 
to 1 RMB (about 0.15 USD). You will be paid immediately by cash plus 30 RMB (5 USD) show-up fee. 
Whole experiment lasts about 60-90 minutes. 
This experiment is a game played by 4 persons in one group. At the beginning of each period, each of you 
will be randomly assigned into a group, and you will play with your three group members anonymously.  
Questionnaire 
Before we start, you have 7 questions to answer on the computer to make sure you understand the rules in 
the game. If and only if everyone correctly answers all the questions, we can start.  
The First Stage 
Each period consists of two stages. After you are randomly and anonymously assigned to a group, the first 
stage begins, and each of you will receive 20 tokens. 
There is a project (the only one) in your group. If you contribute one token in this project, each member in 
your group will get 0.4 token. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you contribute to a project 
and how many you keep. See a sample screenshot in Fig. A.1.  
 
Fig. A.1 Make contribution 
In Fig. A.1, the proposed contribution is 5.0 tokens. After all participants have submitted contributions, 
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your earning in your group in this stage will be calculated by following formula:  
Your earning at first stage = (20 tokens - Your contribution to the project in your group) + 0.4*Total 
contribution to the project in your group 
Notice that your earning comes from two parts: the token you keep (20 tokens - Your contribution to the 
project) and the income from the project (0.4*Total contribution to the Project). For example, if you and 
other three members contribute 5, 15, 20, and 0 respectively, your earning in f irst stage is 31 = (20-5) + 
0.4*(5+15+20+0) tokens. 
At the end of the first stage, your earning will be displayed on the screen. See Fig. A.2 for an example.  
 
Fig. A.2 Earning in the first stage 
The Second Stage 
After the first stage, you will come to the second stage and will be informed about your number in your 
group, group members’ contributions in first stage, including yours. Please notice that your number in your 
group will randomly change in each period, so do others.  
In this stage you are able to use the ‘Points’ function. ‘Points’ makes you be able to reduce member’s 
earning by assigning points to them. If you assign 1 point to a member, you are able to reduce his/her 
earning by 3 tokens, but you have to pay 1 token for purchasing 1 point, so using Points is costly. See a 
sample screenshot in Fig. A.3. 
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Fig. A.3 Displaying and Points 
In the sample given in the Fig. A.3, participant (he) is Member Four. He decides to assign 2, 3 and 1 
point(s) to Member One, Two and Three respectively. So he reduces earnings of Member One, Two and 
Three by 6, 9 and 3 tokens respectively. Meanwhile, he will pay 2+3+1=6 tokens for using 6 Points.  
Please notice that (1) the points you assign to any member can’t exceed 8 tokens; (2) total points you 
assign to all other members can’t exceed your earning in first stage; (3) off course, other group members in 
your group can also reduce your earning by using Points if they want to; (4) if tokens reduced exceeds your 
earning, your earning will equal to 0 automatically, namely we let your earning can NOT be negative, so 
we do to others.  
After all participants have submitted, your earning in your group will be calculated by following formula:  
Your earning at second stage = earning in first stage – total points you assign to others – 3 * total points 
you receive from others. 
For example, if your earning in f irst stage is 31 tokens, you assign 5 points to others, and you receive 2 
points from others, your earning in second stage is 20=31 – 5 – 3*2 tokens. 
Calculation work will be done by computer. After that, you will be informed about the earning in first 
stage, the total amount of points you assign to others, the total amount of points you receive from others 
and your earning in second stage. See a sample screenshot in Fig. A.4. 
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Fig. A.4 Displaying in second stage 
After the second stage one period ends, and then another period begins unless it is the 20
th
 period. 
If you have question, please raise your hand. One of our experimenters will come to help you.  
Control Questions for S Treatment 
1. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C contribute 0, 0, 0 and 0 tokens to Project, what are your 
earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
B:        
C:        
2. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C contribute 20, 20, 20 and 20 tokens to Project, what are 
your earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
B:        
C:        
3. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C contribute 12, 8, 16 and 4 tokens to Project, what are your 
earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
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B:        
C:        
4. Suppose your earning in first stage is 40 tokens. You don’t assign any point to others, but you receive 6 
points from them. What’s your earning at the end of second stage?        
5. Suppose your earning in first stage is 20 tokens. You don’t assign any point to others, but you receive 12 
points from them. What’s your earning at the end of second stage?        
6. Suppose your earning in first stage is 35 tokens. You assign 2, 4, 2 points to Member A, Member B and 
Member C respectively, and you receive 4 points from them. What’s your earning at the end of second 
stage?        
7. If your earning in first stage is 20 tokens, can you successfully do following things? 
(1) Assign 8, 8, 6 points to Member A, Member B and Member C respectively.  
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
(2) Assign 3, 5, 0 points to Member A, Member B and Member C respectively.  
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
(3) Assign 2, 10, 5 points to Member A, Member B and Member C respectively.  
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
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Instruction for T treatment 
Welcome to this economic experiment. Be sure that it is safe, both physically and mentally. 
If you follow the rules in this experiment and make your decision on your own, then you may earn a 
considerable amount of money. Therefore, please carefully read this instruction and learn these rules. 
Talking and any form of communication among you are not allowed when experiment is on. If you have 
any question, please raise your hand.  
The money in the experiment is named ‘token’. The experiment will run 20 periods, namely the game will 
repeat 20 times. You final earning is the total earnings in 20 periods. Earning will be calculated in token, 
and your final earning will be exchanged into RMB (USD) at the end of the experiment. 10 tokens equals 
to 1 RMB (about 0.15 USD). You will be paid immediately by cash plus 30 RMB (5 USD) show-up fee. 
Whole experiment lasts about 60-90 minutes. 
This experiment is a game played by 4 persons in one group. At the beginning of each period, you will be 
randomly assigned into a group, and you will play with others anonymously.  
Questionnaire 
Before we start, you have 7 questions to answer on the computer to make sure you understand the rules in 
the game. If and only if everyone correctly answers all the questions, we can start.  
The First Stage 
Each period consists of two stages. After you are randomly and anonymously assigned to a group, the first 
stage begins, and each of you will receive 20 tokens. 
There is a project (the only one) in your group. If you contribute one token in this project, each member in 
your group will get 0.4 token. You have to decide how many of the 20 tokens you contribute to a project 
and how many you keep. See a sample screenshot in Fig. A.5.  
 
Fig. A.5 make contribution 
In Fig. A.5, the proposed contribution is 5.0 tokens. After all participants have submitted contributions, 
your earning in your group in this stage will be calculated by following formula:  
Your earning at first stage = (20 tokens - Your contribution to the project in your group) + 0.4*Total 
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contribution to the project in your group 
Notice that your earning comes from two parts: the token you keep (20 tokens - Your contribution to the 
project) and the income from the project (0.4*Total contribution to the Project). For example, if you and 
other three members contribute 5, 15, 20, and 0 respectively, your earning in f irst stage is 31 = (20-5) + 
0.4*(5+15+20+0) tokens. 
At the end of the first stage, your earning will be displayed on the screen. See Fig. A.6 for the example. 
 
Fig. A.6 Earning in the first stage 
The Second Stage 
After the first stage, you will come to the second stage and will be informed about your group number, 
your in-group number, and the contributions of another group in the first stage. Please notice the 
contribution information is NOT your group’s contribution information. 
In this stage you are able to use the ‘Points’ function. Towards whom you can use Points is restricted, say 
if you are in Group i, you can only use Points towards members in Group i+1, meanwhile members in 
Group i-1 also can use Points towards you. We have to mention that if you are in the first Group, nobody 
can use Points toward you; but if you are in the last group, you can use points towards nobody (you will 
not get in Stage 2 as well). However, since you are randomly assigned into a group at the beginning of  
every period, each of you gets equal chance to be in the first or last group. Another Restriction is that you 
can’t use Points towards the person whose in-group number is the same to you. Namely you can use Points 
towards 3 persons rather than 4 persons. See Fig. A.7 for a clear sense.  
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Fig. A.7 Points Restriction 
‘Points’ makes you be able to reduce member’s earning by assigning points to them. If you assign 1 point 
to a member, you are able to reduce his/her earning by 3 tokens, but you have to pay 1 token for 
purchasing 1 point, so using Points is costly. See a sample screenshot in Fig. A.8. 
 
 
Fig. A.8 Displaying and Points 
In the sample given in Fig. A.8, participant (he) is Member Four in Group 2. He decides to assign 2, 3 and 
1 point(s) to Member One, Two and Three in Group 3 respectively. So he reduces earnings of them by 6, 9 
and 3 tokens respectively. Meanwhile, he will pay 2+3+1=6 tokens for using 6 Points.  
Please notice that (1) the points you assign to any member can’t exceed 8 tokens; (2) total points you 
assign to all other members can’t exceed your earning in first stage; (3) off course, members in other 
group can also reduce your earning by using Points if they want to; (4) if tokens reduced by Points exceeds 
A 
B 
C 
D 
A’ 
B’ 
C’ 
D’ 
A’’ 
B’’ 
C’’ 
D’’ 
Group i-1 Group i Group i+1 
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your earning, your earning will equal to 0 automatically, namely we let your earning can NOT be negative, 
so we do to others.  
After all participants have submitted, your earning in your group will be calculated by following formula:  
Your earning at second stage = earning in first stage – total points you assign to others – 3 * total points 
you receive from others. 
For example, if your earning in f irst stage is 31 tokens, you assign 5 points to others, and you receive 2 
points from others, so your earning in second stage is 20=31 – 5 – 3*2 tokens. Calculation work will be 
done by computer. After that, you will be informed about the earning in first stage, the total amount of 
points you assign to others, the total amount of points you receive from others and your earning in second 
stage. See the sample screenshot in Fig. A.9. 
 
Fig. A.9 Displaying in second stage 
After the second stage one period ends, and then another period begins unless it is the 20
th
 period. 
If you have question, please raise your hand. One of our experimenters will come to help you.  
Control Questions for T Treatment 
1. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C in the same group contribute 0, 0, 0 and 0 tokens to 
Project, what are your earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
B:        
C:        
2. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C in the same group contribute 20, 20, 20 and 20 tokens to 
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Project, what are your earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
B:        
C:        
3. If you, Member A, Member B and Member C in the same group contribute 12, 8, 16 and 4 tokens to 
Project, what are your earnings at the end of first stage?  
You:        
A:        
B:        
C:        
4. Suppose you are in Group 3 and your earning in first stage is 40 tokens. You don’t assign any point to 
others, but you receive 6 points from others. What’s your earning at the end of second stage?        
5. Suppose you are in Group 3 and your earning in first stage is 20 tokens. You don’t assign any point to 
others, but you receive 12 points from others. What’s your earning at the end of second stage?        
6. Suppose you are in Group 3 and your earning in first stage is 35 tokens. You assign 2, 4, 2 points to 
Member A, Member B and Member C in Group 4 respectively, and you receive 4 points from others. 
What’s your earning at the end of second stage?        
7. If you are in Group 3 and your earning in first stage is 20 tokens, can you do following things? 
(1) Assign 8, 8, 6 points to Member A, Member B and Member C in Group 4 respectively.  
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
(2) Assign 3, 5, 0 points to Member A, Member B and Member C in Group 4 respectively.  
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
(3) Assign 2, 10, 5 points to Member A, Member B and Member C in Group 4 respectively. 
(i) YES   (ii) NO 
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Supplemental Material B: Punishment Dynamics 
 
(a) Frequency 
 
(b) Severity 
Figure B1 punishment dynamics: frequency and severity over periods 
 
 
Figure B2 punishment distribution: group average contribution as benchmark 
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Supplemental Material C: Punishment Decision Model and Punishment 
Severity Model 
We employ the inequity-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr, E., and K.M. Schmidt. “A Theory of Fairness, 
Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 1999, 817–68), the Equity Reciprocity 
Competition (ERC) model of Bolton and Ockenfels (Bolton, G.E., and A. Ockenfels. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, 
Reciprocity and Competition.” American Economic Review, 90(1), 2000, 166–93), and the contribution norm of 
Reuben and Riedl (2013) to investigate second-party and third-party punishment.  
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that inequity-averse people suffer from psychological utility loss for both 
disadvantageous inequality caused by those who contribute less to public goods (namely lower 
contributors) and advantageous inequality caused by those who contribute more to public goods (namely 
higher contributors), hence as the second-party and third party they should punish both types of 
contributors. If we observe both lower and higher contributors are punished, then we find experimental 
evidence consistent with inequity-aversion model. 
The ERC theory of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predicts that people with equity preference suffer from 
utility loss because of the violation of equity, which is measured by the payoff deviation from the group 
average. Therefore, a second party or a third party with equity preference would punish those who 
contribute both less and more than the group average. In fact equity preference is conceptually close to 
inequity-aversion. The difference is that the ERC model emphasizes equity at group level while the 
inequity-aversion model emphasizes individual inequality
4
.  
From the perspective of contribution norm (Reuben and Riedl 2013), a person should contribute to the 
public good as much as possible (efficiency rule) or should contribute a fair amount compared to others’ 
contributions (relative contribution rule). Hence, a third party holding such norm cares about the overall 
efficiency of the whole group. As the overall efficiency (measured by average contribution) increases, a 
second party or a third party would become less likely to punish others. If we identify a negative 
correlation between a group’s average contribution level and the average punishment level they received, 
then we find evidence suggesting that third parties also rely on the contribution norm to punish.  
We run separate regressions for punishment decision and punishment severity to test how they are related 
to factors such as social preference and norm. In the test, NegDiffI and PosDiffI denote the 
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality at individual level respectively. PosDiffG and NegDiffG 
denote positive and negative violations of equity at group average level respectively. Contribution norm is 
denoted by GroOthA. See Table C.1 for the variable definitions. We include Period, the integer period 
number, to control for the time trend of punishment, as well as some demographic variables such as gender, 
family wealth, and major.  
 
Table C.1 The definition of variable 
                                                                 
4 For example, A, B, C, and D contribute 20, 15, 5, and 0 tokens respectively. From the perspective of inequity 
aversion, B, C, and D are lower contributors than A. However, f rom the perspective of equity, only C and D are 
lower contributors (lower than average 10). Hence, inequity-aversion model predicts that A would punish B, C, 
and D, while ERC model predicts that A would punish only C and D. 
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variables definition 
GroOthA Average contribution of the other group members (the punished member excluded).  
PosDiffG Positive contribution difference from the punished member to the average contribution of the other group members.  
NegDiffG Negative contribution difference from the punished member to average contribution of the other group members.  
PosDiffI Punished individual's contribution difference to punishing individual if the former contributes more. 
NegDiffI Punished individual's contribution difference to punishing individual if the later contributes more.  
P_decision Whether one person gets punished (0=NO; 1=Yes).  
P_received The amount of punishment received if any. 
Punishing The amount of punishment assigned to others if any 
Gender Male or female (0=male; 1=female). 
Major The student's major (0=non-economics; 1=economics). 
Wealth Economic status (0=rich; 1=poor). 
Since punishment decision is binary variable, we use logit regression. Because the data has panel structure, 
we also run panel regression to double check. Since PosDiffG strongly correlates with PosDiffI, as well as 
NegDiffG with NegDiffI, we exclude PosDiffG and NegDiffG in our regressions
5
. This is reasonable as 
inequality-aversion model and ERC model are quite close in term of fairness. We also exclude constant 
term as incorporating constant term lowers model’s performance.  
Table C.2 SPP decision model 
Independent 
variables 
Logit Logit 
(robust) 
Logit 
(cluster: 
subject) 
Logit 
(cluster: 
period) 
Panel 
(fixed effect) 
Panel 
(random 
effect) 
GroOthA -.026 
(.041) 
-.026 
(.039) 
-.026 
(.059) 
-.026 
(.044) 
-.001 
(.064) 
-.025 
(.058) 
PosDiffI 
-.012 
(.045) 
-.012 
(.048) 
-.012 
(.057) 
-.012 
(.054) 
.028 
(.056) 
.020 
(.053) 
NegDiffI 
.536*** 
(.067) 
.536*** 
(.066) 
.536*** 
(.069) 
.536*** 
(.066) 
.680*** 
(.090) 
.674*** 
(.086) 
Period 
-.074*** 
(.014) 
-.074*** 
(.013) 
-.074*** 
(.016) 
-.074*** 
(.018) 
-- -- 
Gender -.746*** 
(.187) 
-.746*** 
(.182) 
-.746*** 
(.349) 
-.746*** 
(.147) 
-- -1.074** 
(.431) 
Wealth .052 
(.160) 
.052 
(.155) 
.052 
(.307) 
.052 
(.127) 
-- -.595** 
(.267) 
Major .072 
(.274) 
.072 
(.257) 
.072 
(.552) 
.072 
(.248) 
-- .176 
(.635) 
Observations 720 720 720 720 720 720 
log-likelihood -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -395.2 -276.1 -374.8 
Hausman test -- -- -- -- p=0.557 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10; standard error in bracket. 
 
 
                                                                 
5 Their correlation coefficients are greater than 0.97 in our panel sample data, 
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Table C.3 TPP decision model 
Independent 
variables 
Logit Logit 
(robust) 
Logit 
(cluster: 
subject) 
Logit 
(cluster: 
period) 
Panel 
fixed effect 
Panel 
random 
effect 
GroOthA .029 
(.041) 
.029 
(.039) 
.029 
(.047) 
.029 
(.043) 
.060 
(.048) 
.013 
(.042) 
PosDiffI 
-.001 
(.041) 
-.001 
(.042) 
-.001 
(.047) 
-.001 
(.035) 
.112** 
(.050) 
.030 
(.048) 
NegDiffI 
.452*** 
(.065) 
.452*** 
(.063) 
.452*** 
(.073) 
.452*** 
(.070) 
.515*** 
(.074) 
.479*** 
(.069) 
Period 
-.066** 
(.021) 
-.066** 
(.022) 
-.066** 
(.021) 
-.066** 
(.026) 
-- -- 
Gender -.274 
(.440) 
-.274 
(.462) 
-.274 
(.512) 
-.274 
(.476) 
-- -.732 
(.475) 
Wealth .108 
(.223) 
.108 
(.219) 
.108 
(.228) 
.108 
(.199) 
-- -.058 
(.248) 
Major -.794* 
(.450) 
-.794* 
(.461) 
-.794 
(.553) 
-.794* 
(.483) 
-- -1.206** 
(.497) 
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 400 
log-likelihood -208.3 -208.3 -208.3 -208.3 -162.2 -213.2 
Hausman test -- -- -- -- p=0.000 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10; standard error in bracket. 
Table C.2 and Table C.3 report the regression results of the decision models. Second-party punishment and 
third-party punishment have similar coefficients on NegDiffI. All regressions indicate inequity aversion did 
affect people’s punishment decisions. Namely, players were more likely to punish free riders. This finding 
is constant with the prediction of inequity aversion model. The coefficient of GroOthA are insignif icant in 
all models PosDiffI seems to have no significant effect in the process of decision making, probably this is 
because the majority of punishment is normal ones, that’s say, the larger proportion of normal punishment 
diluted the effect of a smaller proportion of antisocial punishment.  
Table C.4 and Table C.5 display the results of the punishment severity regression models. The patterns of 
third-party and second-party punishment severity are similar. The difference is that third-party punishers 
assigned heavier punishment to free riders, as suggested by the positive coefficients of NegDiffI. The 
coefficients on PosDiffI in SPP and TPP severity models are positive and significant, indicating both SPP 
and TPP are not completely impartial. However, the coefficient of PosDiffI in SPP severity model is 
slightly higher than in TPP model, indicating that third-party punishment was comparably less antisocially 
than second-party punishment.. To sum up, the signs and magnitudes of these coefficients generally match 
the pattern as shown in Figure 2 in the manuscript. 
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Table C.4 SPP Severity model 
Independent 
variables 
OLS OLS 
(robust) 
OLS 
(cluster: 
subject) 
OLS 
(cluster: 
period) 
Panel 
fixed 
effect 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(GLS) 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(ML) 
GroOthA .004 
(.013) 
.004 
(.015) 
.004 
(.012) 
.004 
(.021) 
-.038** 
(.019) 
-.031* 
(.017) 
.004 
(.013) 
PosDiffI 
.048*** 
(.016) 
.048*** 
(.017) 
.048** 
(.020) 
.048*** 
(.014) 
.029 
(.020) 
.031* 
(.016) 
.047*** 
(.015) 
NegDiffI 
.099*** 
(.015) 
.099*** 
(.018) 
.099*** 
(.020) 
.099*** 
(.018) 
.111*** 
(.019) 
.095*** 
(.015) 
.099*** 
(.015) 
Period 
.003 
(.005) 
.003 
(.004) 
.003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.004) 
-- -- -- 
Gender -.012 
(.067) 
-.012 
(.058) 
-.012 
(.073) 
-.012 
(.058) 
-- -.038** 
(.066) 
.007 
(.066) 
Wealth .206*** 
(.057) 
.206*** 
(.056) 
.206*** 
(.039) 
.206*** 
(.068) 
-- .101 
(.063) 
.221*** 
(.052) 
Major .038 
(.099) 
.038 
(.125) 
.038 
(.111) 
.038 
(.100) 
-- .074 
(.098) 
.028 
(.098) 
        
Observations 301 301 301 301 301 301 301 
R2 .676 .676 .676 .676 -- -- -- 
F statistics -- -- -- -- 12.5 -- -- 
Wald Chi2 -- -- -- -- -- 47.7 614.5 
Hausman test -- -- -- -- -- p=0.452 n.a. 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10; standard error in bracket. 
Note that the coefficients of PosDiffI is almost the same in both SPP and TPP severity model, not as what 
is displayed in the right side of Figure 2 in the manuscript. This is because in severity models we 
incorporated both normal punishment and antisocial cases. After we excluded normal punishment cases, 
we find the difference becomes obvious as shown in the regression result in Table C.6. The sign of 
PosDiffI in antisocial SPP severity model is positive while it is signif icantly negative in antisocial TPP 
severity model. 
To test whether blind revenge existed in our sample, we regress punishment in current period on 
punishment received in last period, controlling for gender, wealth, major, and other variables that may 
affect punishment. If blind revenge does exist, we would expect a subject’s punishment spending to be 
positively related to the punishment received lagged by one period. Table C.7 and Table C.8 report the 
results for decision model and severity model respectively.  
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Table C.5 TPP severity model 
Independent 
variables 
OLS OLS 
(robust) 
OLS 
(cluster: 
subject) 
OLS 
(cluster: 
period) 
Panel 
fixed 
effect 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(GLS) 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(ML) 
GroOthA .001 
(.017) 
.001 
(.017) 
.001 
(.020) 
.001 
(.022) 
.008 
(.022) 
.003 
(.020) 
-.002 
(.016) 
PosDiffI 
.046** 
(.023) 
.046*** 
(.015) 
.046*** 
(.014) 
.046*** 
(.014) 
.047 
(.030) 
.050** 
(.024) 
.047** 
(.023) 
NegDiffI 
.222*** 
(.016) 
.222*** 
(.020) 
.222*** 
(.016) 
.222*** 
(.017) 
.227*** 
(.020) 
.225*** 
(.017) 
.222*** 
(.016) 
Period 
-.007 
(.009) 
-.007 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.008) 
-.007 
(.008) 
-- -- -- 
Gender .161 
(.192) 
.161 
(.171) 
.161 
(.112) 
.161 
(.217) 
-- .226 
(.298) 
.131 
(.185) 
Wealth .043 
(.100) 
.043 
(.098) 
.043 
(.093) 
.043 
(.101) 
-- .061 
(.115) 
.038 
(.099) 
Major .017 
(.206) 
.017 
(.183) 
.017 
(.118) 
.017 
(.217) 
-- .077 
(.293) 
-.009 
(.200) 
        
Observations 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
R2 .767 .767 .767 .767 -- -- -- 
F statistics -- -- -- -- 53.1 -- -- 
Wald Chi2 -- -- -- -- -- 208.5 706.9 
Hausman test -- -- -- -- -- p=0.905 n.a. 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10; standard error in bracket. 
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Table C.6 Second-party and third-party antisocial punishment severity models 
 Second-party antisocial punishment Third-party antisocial punishment 
Independent 
variables 
OLS OLS 
(robust) 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(ML) 
OLS OLS 
(robust) 
Panel 
random 
effect 
(ML) 
GroOthA .050*** 
(.016) 
.050*** 
(.015) 
.028 
(.019) 
-.011 
(.020) 
-.011 
(.020) 
-.021 
(.019) 
PosDiffI 
.031* 
(.016) 
.031** 
(.015) 
.019 
(.017) 
-.042** 
(.023) 
-.042*** 
(.015) 
-.040** 
(.020) 
Period 
.006 
(.006) 
.006 
(.006) 
-- -.015 
(.010) 
-.015 
(.008) 
-- 
Gender -.052 
(.091) 
-.052 
(.090) 
.008 
(.112) 
.946*** 
(.197) 
.946*** 
(.230) 
.911*** 
(.193) 
Wealth .098 
(.078) 
.098 
(.066) 
.217** 
(.088) 
.209* 
(.107) 
.209* 
(.110) 
.187* 
(.105) 
Major .130 
(.135) 
.130 
(.190) 
.082 
(.172) 
.678*** 
(.209) 
.678*** 
(.243) 
.668*** 
(.205) 
       
Observations 154 154 154 129 129 129 
R2 .612 .612 -- .604 .604 -- 
Wald Chi2 -- -- 117.1 -- -- 190.9 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10; standard error in bracket. 
 
Table C.7 Test for blind revenge decision 
Punishment 
decision 
Second-party blind revenge decision Third-party blind revenge decision 
Logit Panel 
fixed effect 
Panel 
random effect 
Logit Panel 
fixed effect 
Panel 
random effect 
P_received(-1) .021** .193** .199*** -.021 -.001 -.008 
P_received -.079 -.110 -.094 -.048 -.023 -.031 
Punishing(-1) .519*** -.005 .113 .126*** -.002 .053 
Period -.054*** -- -- -.036** -- -- 
Gender .609*** -- 1.118* -14.572 -- -18.11 
Wealth -.640*** -- -1.266** .704*** -- .913** 
Major .617** -- 1.031 -14.90 -- -18.386 
constant .152 -- .185 13.750 -- 16.600 
       
Observations 720 720 720 480 480 480 
log-likelihood -402.6 -252.1 -352.3 -293.6 -219.2 -283.5 
Hausman test -- Fail -- P<.01 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; **0.05; *0.10. “(-1)” means lagging one period. Hausman test fails because it didn’t 
meet asymptotic assumptions. 
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Table C.8 Test for blind revenge severity 
Punishment 
severity  
Second-party blind revenge severity  Third-party blind revenge severity  
OLS Panel 
fixed effect 
Panel 
random effect 
OLS Panel 
fixed effect 
Panel 
random effect 
P_received(-1) .122 .115 .119 -.155* -.058 -.141 
P_received .091 .079 .108 -.176** -.033 -.137 
Punishing(-1) .476*** -.32 .479*** .568*** -.023 .577*** 
Period -.031 -- -- -.087** -- -- 
Gender .334 -- .309 -1.452*** -- -1.469*** 
Wealth -.534* -- -.561** .593 -- .450 
Major -.167 -- -.174 Omitted -- Omitted 
constant 2.201*** 2.198*** 1.940*** 3.518*** 4.035*** 2.784*** 
       
Observations 270 270 270 195 195 195 
Hausman test -- P<.01 -- P<.01 
Adjusted R2 .335 -- -- .438 -- -- 
F statistics -- 1.23 -- -- 0.28 -- 
Wald chi square --  139.7 --  155.9 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; **0.05; *0.10. “(-1)” means lagging one period. “Omitted” means some variables 
were omitted for collinearity.  
 
The positive coefficient of P_received(-1) in SPP decision model suggests that some second-party 
punishers indeed made blind revenge decisions. However, blind revenge effect only existed in the SPP 
decision model but not in the severity model, i.e. punishment points received in the previous period 
influenced the decision of whether to punish, but not the punishment severity. Why blind revenge takes this 
pattern leads to an open question. 
 
28 
 
Supplemental Material D 
Negative experience, emotion and punishment: a simple online quasi-experiment 
 
Although the argument that negative experience and emotion associate with stronger punishment is quite 
intuitive, we did an additional simple online quasi-experiment to provide solid evidence. Two treatments, 
Baseline and Experience were designed under between-subject protocol. 
 
In Baseline, subjects were lead to imagine that they were stolen 1000 dollars by a thief (framed as younger 
twin brother). The thief was caught. Subjects were given the power to punish the thief. Subjects were asked 
how much angry they felt and how many months they would like to put the thief in jail (i.e., second-party 
punishment). The Experience treatment was framed similarly to Baseline, except for adding that subjects 
couldn’t punish the first thief  who stole from them, but observed a second  thief (the older twin brother) 
stealing from someone else. Subjects in Experience were asked their emotion state and how many months 
they would like to put the second thief in jail (i.e., third-party punishment). By this design, the subjects 
first had negative experienced and then again observed similar negative experience. We expect 
punishment in Experience to be heavier than Baseline, as the more negative Experience would trigger 
more negative emotions. 
 
The quasi-experiment was constructed by using a convenient online questionnaire platform, a company 
known as Wen Juan Xing (http://www.wenjuan.com/). Methodologically, we conducted this 
quasi-experiment in a similar way as suggested by Horton et al (Horton, J. J., Rand, D. G., and Zeckhauser, R. 
J.,  "The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market" , Experimental Economics, 14(3), 2011: 399-425).  
First, we prepared the experiment via Wen Juan Xing; second, we posted online recruitment ads, and then 
the experiment was conducted automatically; thirdly, we collected data which were summarized 
automatically by Wen Juan Xing; fourthly, we paid subjects.  
 
The quasi-experiment was conducted on Jing Guan Zhi Jia (http://bbs.pinggu.org/) on 27-28 Jan, 2016, a 
Chinese online platform where people could view, contribute, share, buy, and sell their resources, 
knowledges, and effort. Most of the users on the platform are students, teachers, and researchers. Each 
subject was paid 10 Luntanbi, which is the currency used on the platform. People can use Luntanbi to pay 
others for completing online surveys, finding materials,  analyzing data, writing report, etc. From the 
perspective of the online market, Jing Guan Zhi Jia is similar to Amazon Mechanical Turk, though on a 
smaller scale. Totally 80 subjects took part in this quasi-experiment. We excluded 4 extreme cases, 
resulting 37 subjects in Baseline and 39 subjects in Experience, 35 females and 41 males. 
 
Table D.1 displays the basic statistics. As expected, the average emotion level in Baseline was lower than 
the average level in Experience (8.0 vs. 7.5), though the t-test does not show significant difference. 
However, we observe much stronger punishment in Treatment (8.6 vs. 3.9).  
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Table D.1 Baseline vs. Treatment (Experience) 
Treatments Emotion (anger) Punishment (month in jail) 
Baseline 7.5 (0.31) 3.9 (0.85) 
Experience 8.0 (0.28) 8.6 (1.42) 
T-test p=.246 p=.005 
Note: standard error in bracket 
 
OLS regression results show that punishment level is signif icantly positively correlated with anger, after 
controlling for other factors, as shown in Table D.2. When the emotion of anger is stronger, the heavier is 
the punishment. 
Table D.2 Regression 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Punishment 
Anger 1.009** 
Treatment Dummy (0=baseline, 1=treatment) 4.435*** 
Gender (1=male, 2= female) -.541 
Past experience of being stolen (0=No, 1= Yes) -3.219* 
Constant -12.175* 
Adjusted R
2
 .139*** 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** 0.05; * 0.10. 
 
The results suggest more negative experience triggers negative emotions, which triggers heavier 
punishment. This finding further implies experience and observation of more free riding could lead to 
heavier punishment. 
 
 
